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The United States, France, and many other industrial countries
experienced a significant slowdown in the growth of productivity in
the recent decade. This slowdown exacerbated inflationary pressures
and contributed to the growing pessimism about the prospects for
future economic growth. Its causes are still unclear and controver-
sial. It makes a difference from a policy response point of view
whether it was caused by insufficient investment, by rising energy
and raw materials prices, or by a decline in the fecundity of R&D
and the exhaustion of technological opportunities.'
In this paper we bring a comparative perspective to the analysis
of some of these issues.To accomplish this we had to assemble and
construct consistent and comparable data sets for French and United
States manufacturing industries and firms. After a discussion of the
respective data sets and a description of the extent of the slowdown
in productivity growth in the two countries and the great variability
in it, we turn to an analysis of the potential causes of such fluctua-
tions. At the industrial level, we focus on the contribution of capital
and the rise in material prices to an explanation of the observed pro-
ductivity slowdown. At the firm level we look also more closely at
the potential effect of R&D expenditures on productivity growth. A
number of tentative conclusions close the paper.—2—
I. Productivity Growth at the Industry Level
A. Data and Basic Facts
In this section we focus on comparing total factor productivity
growth rates in manufacturing industries at the approximate 2—digit
level in both France and the United States. Our industry breakdown
(described in the Appendix, Table Al) is somewhat unorthodox. It is
the result of trying to match the U.S. SIC classification to the
French NAP classification, and was chosen primarily on the basis of
the availability of the French data, and secondarily because of our
interest in R&D (which led us to subdivide several industries). It
differs from the usual 2—digit SIC scheme in the U.S. mainly by the
separation of drugs and "paDachemicals" from the other chemicals,
the aggregation of several minor industries, and the exclusion
of the petroleum refining industry from manufacturing so defined.
The French estimates are based on national accounts publications,
augmented by various unpublished data from the "branch" (establishment
level) and "sector" (company level) accounts. The U.S. estimates were
aggregated from the 4—digit SIC level detail data base constructed by
Froinm et al (1979) on the basis of the Census Annual Surveys of Manu-
factures and National Income account based detailed deflators.Both
data sets yield a gross output measure (shipments adjusted for inventory
changes) in constant (1972) prices and divide inputs into three cate-
gories: labor (man—hours), capital (gross capital stock in constant
prices), and purchased materials (intermediate consumption including
energy inputs). With each input and output measure we associate a set
of price indexes and cost shares. For each of our 15 industries, in
both countries, we compute Tornqruist Divisia total input indexes and use—3—
them to construct Total Factor Productivity (TFP) indexes for the
12—year period, 1967—78, and for two sub—periods: 1967—73 and 1973—78.
The final results of these rather extensive computations are given in
Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 1.
For the period as a whole, the rate of growth of total factor
productivity was higher in France than in the U.S. and this was also
true for each industry separately. The median difference was on the
order of one percent per year with larger differences occurring in the
"heavy" industries (primary Metals, Fabricated Metals, Machinery, and
Aircraft and Boats). In both countries productivity slowed signifi-
cantly in the second sub—period, though here the results are much more
variable across industries. For aggregate manufacturing the decelera-
tion was somewhat larger in the U.S. (by about .7 percent).2
If we divide the periods so that they are equal in length and inde-
pendently constructed, i.e., if we use 1967 to 1972 as our first period,
we can do an analysis of variance on the resulting 60 TFP growth numbers,
using country, period and industry as classification categories. This
yields the following estimates: an average TFP growth rate (in both
countries across all industries) of 0.8, an average French advantage over
the U.S. of 1.5 percent per year, and an average deceleration of 1.0 per-
cent between the two periods. In terms of contribution to the total
variance in TFP growth, the most important factors are country and period,
with computed F statistics of 25 and 11 respectively (the .05 critical
value of the F statistic with 1 and 43 degrees of freedom is about 4).
Surprisingly, industrial differences contribute relatively little (the
computed F =1constrasted to a critical F95 (14,43) of about 2), though—4—
individually two industries (electrical equipment and aircraft) have
significantly above average TFP growth rates. This is a rather un-
fortunate finding from our point of view since we had hoped to find
consistent and significant differences in the rate of productivity
growth across industries which might have provided clues to causes
of the productivity slowdown. In fact, no consistent industrial dif-
ferences emerged, either within or across countries.
If we look at the numbers for the more recent subperiod in Table
1, the biggest difference between the two countries in TFP growth occurs
in the chemicals (excluding drugs) industry, while the smallest are in
textiles, leather, electrical equipment and drugs. It should be noted
here that some of these differences may be spurious, the result of errors
in the basic data. The biggest potential source of error comes from the
price indexes, which could be both erroneous and improperly associated
with the relevant industry output. One becomes suspicious of the numbers
when one notices that in the U.S. chemicals industry capital grew by 5.7
percent per year during 1973—78, materials purchased grew at 9.6 percent,
while output went up by only 3.1 percent per year. The other numbers
could be wrong, but the suspicion falls on the output number and the
associate price index when we note that it had the highest rate of growth
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of all the industrial price indexes ——13.2percent per year.At this
moment, however, we have no way of checking what are basically ingredients
of the national Income accounts computations. We do want to warn the
reader not to place too much confidence in the various numbers; there may
still be quite a bit of error left in them.4—5—
Looking at Table 2, which lists the components of the TFP calcula-
tion for aggregate manufacturing, we observe that output growth in
France was significantly higher in the 1967—73 period (7 vs. 4 percent)
and fell by more in the 1973—78 period than in the U.S., to roughly
equivalent levels (about 2 percent per year). Throughout both period,
fixed capital was growing faster in France than in the U.S., at the
rate of 1 to 2 percent more per year. The big puzzle is in the behavior
of manhours. In the earlier period their growth is small and roughly
parallel but diverges sharply during 1973—78. In France labor use
declines at about —2 percent per year, while in the U.S. it rises at
over 1 percent per year, in the face of a severe output growthslump.5
There is also a divergence in the materials use story. Materials use
is growing much faster in France during the first period and the drop
in the second period is much sharper than in the U.S. (from over 7 to
about 1 percent per year versus a drop from 3.5 to only 2.5 in the
U.S.).
Looking at the price side, average output price inflation was slightly
higher in France, by about 1 percent per year, but not strikingly so.
This is true also of material prices, which rose slightly faster in France.
The .big discrepancy, however, is again in labor. Wages appear to have
grown much faster in France, accelerating in the second period to a rate
double that in the U.S.. While the real cost of both labor and materials
remained roughly constant in the U.S. in the second period (and rose only
gradually in the first), in France real labor costs were rising
sharply in both periods (at a rate of 6 to 7 percent per year). This
may provide a "push" tyexplanation for the more rapid productivity growth—6—
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in France than in the U.S. though the causality is far from clear here.
B. Looking for Causes of the Slowdown: Capital and Materials.
There are three potential explanations of the productivity slow-
down and the shortfall of the U.S. relative to other countries in this
regard which we can explore with our data: differences in investment,
a differential rise in materials (and energy) prices, and different
R&D policies. Those who claim that part of the productivity slowdown
can be explained by a shortfall in the rate of capital investment, must
have in mind a model in which the contribution of capital to output
growth exceeds its factor share for some reason or other (disequilibrium,
taxation, or the embodiment of technical change).7While capital stock
was growing somewhat faster in France than in the U.S., the TFP calcula-
tions take this already into account, to a first order of approximation.
One way to check on this is to take apart the TFP calculation and ask
whether output growth was faster (slower) in sectors which experienced
above (below) average growth in capital input.
Defining the "production function" as
q =A+ cQ + c + yin + e
•where q, £,c,m, and A denote rates of growth of output, labor, capi-
tal, materials and disembodied technical change respectively; o, ,and
y are the respective input elasticies of output, and e is a disturbance
term. Approximating the relevant elasticities by their corresponding
factor shares, we estimate
q = + b1(s) + b2(sc) + b3(Sm) + e—7-.
where the constants (technical change terms) are allowed to differ
across countries Ci) and periods (t), If the TFP calculations are
roughly right, the estimated b's should
be around unity. If an input is in some sense "more importantt' than
that, it should show up with a coefficient significantly above unity.
The results reported in Table 3Ado not support the capital (or
materials) story.8 Only the labor coefficient exceeds unity signif i—
cantly and even this result disappears when we exclude the chemicals
industry with its dubious 1973—78 numbers from the U.S. equation. The
capital coefficients are not significantly different from unity, either
in the direct production function estimates, or the partial productivity
versions, where we first treat labor and then both labor and materials
as endogeneous variables, constraining their elasticities to equal their
factor shares, and subtracting them from the left hand side.9 If any-
thing, the coefficient of capital is lower in France than in the U.S.,
which is exactly the opposite of what would have been needed to provide
an explanation for the more rapid productivity growth in France. This
is even more obvious when we try to explain cross—country differences
in sectoral output growth. There, the estimated capital coefficient
actually turns negative, though not significantly so; implying that
output was growing faster in France than in the U.S., in industries
where the relative capital growth was lower.10
As far as materials are concerned, while the direct coefficients
are sometimes higher than unity, the differences are not statistically
or economically significant. The materials story, suggested especially
by Bruno (1981), is based on the notion that in the short—run their elas-
ticity of substitution is less than unity and that a response to a sharp—8—
rise in their price is more costly to output growth than is implied
by the standard formulae. This can be tested either by looking at the
estimated coefficient of materials in the "product.ion function" frame-
work, or by substituting the real price of materials for the more
endogeneous materials quantityvariable.
Treating materials as a separate input with an elasticity of
substitution a< 1between itself and the aggregate of other inputs
(value added, consisting of capital and labor) one can write the
equation to be estimated as
A
q - = + c -i- mq'
+ e
where, in addition to the symbols defined above, p and Pq are the
growth rates of materials and output prices respectively.12When such
an equation is estimated, it yields invariably the wrong sign for the
coefficient of the weighted real price of materils [(5m/(l_Sm)l(PmPq)
implying that productivity improved in industries where real material
prices rose more rapidly. This could be due to errors in the measure-
ment of industrial output prices, since both the construction of the
output variable and the real materials price variable depend on the same
output price deflators. An attempt was made to get around this problem
by treating p —Pq
as endogeneous and using p and p (the growth rate
of wage rates) as additional instruments.
This yielded a negative but not statistically significant—9—
coefficient for the real price of materials, with an estimated 0of
about .2.
Actually, it is not all that surprising that we cannot get much
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from the materials story since the basic facts go the wrong way.
The growth in material use fell more sharply in France than in the
U.S. and hence cannot account for the sharper productivity deceleration
in the U.S..Nor is there any evidence that real materials prices
were rising more rapidly in the U.S. or accelerated more there; if
anything the opposite appears to be the case. Thus, whatever explana-
tion they may provide for the short—term timing of such movements, the
rise in material prices cannot explain the persistent and increasing
difference between French and U.S. productivity growth.14
Another way of looking at the relationships between our variables
is to look at the dual price side. Treating output price as dependent,
one can write.
Pq
=\ ++ c+ +
where, in addition to the terms defined above, p, and i are rates of
growth in labor and capital price indexes and c is a disturbance.
Table 3B presents the results of such regressions where, as before,
factor shares replace ,, andy,andthe estimated coefficients




= — (a/s) (P1'q)—1mq)
+ c—10—
which endogeneize the price of capital (using the real return to capital
as the dependent variable) are also reported in this table. In the
direct price equations there is a stark contrast between U.S. and
France. In the U.S. labor cost and especially materials price increases
were transmitted to product prices more than proportionally, more than
could have been predicted by their relative importance in total costs.
In France, material price increases appear to have had less than their
predicted impact on product prices. When factor price frontier equations
are estimated, with the real return to capital as the dependent variable,
real material prices invariably come out with the wrong sign. Somehow,
the spuriousness introduced by errors in the output price deflators -
appearsto dominate. This is another manifestation of a problem that
is endemic to such data ——realfactor price differences are rather
small across industries within any one country, small relative to the
size of transitory and erroneously measured movements in output prices.
One way of reducing the endogeneity of the right hand terms in the
factor price frontier equation is to solve out both the output price
and the endogeneous capital return measure from the right hand side of
this equation. This leads to the estimation of "partial price equations"
withPq — asthe dependent variable, i.e.
Pq -c= + + m + E
Theseequations (listed in the middle of Table 3B) also imply an above
average transmission of wage and materials price changes to output prices—11—
in the U.S. relative to France. If factor prices have had a special
role in this story, it has been their differential impact in the two
countries. Thus, they cannot provide a unified explanation for the
events in both countries.
C. The Role of R&D
We cannot really analyze the contribution of R&D to productivity
growth in any detail in this section because there are no R&D time
series at the industry level in France. We do have, however, French
data on R&D expenditures and employment by industry for 1975 and we
can use similar U.S. data (see Appendix Table 3) to investigate
whether differences in productivity growth are related to differences
in R&D intensity. An earlier study (Griliches and Lichtenberg, 1981)
found that one can attribute only very little of the productivity
showdown in the U.S. to the retardation that occurred in the growth
of R&D in the late 1960's. This study utilized a more detailed indus-
trial breakdown and showed that the relationship between TFP growth
and the R&D to sales ratio did not deteriorate in the 1970's. More-
over, it indicated that the R&D to sales ratios remained relatively
stable across industries between the 60's and 70's (r2 for the correla-
tion of R/S in 1964—68 and 1969—73 across 27 manufacturing industries
was.97). Assuming a similar stability in France, we may use the 1975
data to proxy also for the unavailable earlier data.
If we combine all of our data for the two countries, two periods,
and 15 industries (N =Cx T x I =60),and estimate a common R&D
coefficient in the two countries, using a seemingly unrelated regression—12—
framework, we get the following equation:
TFP= .23DUS1 —1.02DUS2 + 1.49 DF1 + .76 DF2 + .28 R/S
(.31) (.37) (.31) (.29) (.09)
SEE =1.10
where DUS1 is the U.S. constant term (average rate of TFP Growth)
in the first period, and similarly for the other terms, while R/S
is the ratio of company financed R&D expenditures to total sales in
the respective countries)5 The estimated R&D coefficient implies
a 28 percent excess gross rate of return to R&D investment. It is
excess because much of the R&D input is already counted once in the
construction of labor and capital and it is gross because no allow-
ance has been made for possible depreciation of R&D capital (see
Griliches 1979 and Schankerman 1981 for a more detailed interpretation
of such coefficients).
When we allow for separate country coefficients we get the fol-
lowing equation instead:
TFP =.30DUS1 —.94DUS2 + 1.42 DF1 + .68 DF2
(.33) (.38) (.36) (.33)
+ .23 R/S(US)+ .33 R/S(F)
(.12) (.14)
SEE =1.11
The difference between the U.S. and French coefficient is substantial
but not statistically significant.
The estimated R/S coefficient for the U.S. (.23) is comparable to
what we found in the earlier study. If we accept such a rate of return—13--
or even if it were twice as high, this still would not account for
much of the deceleration of TFP in the U.S., since the decline in
R&D to sales ratio was in fact rather small.16 Nor can our estimates
account for the differences in TFP growth between France and the U.S.,
since the R&D to sales ratios tend to be lower at the industry level
in France than in the U.S.. We re—examine this conclusion, however,
in the next section where the available micro data contain more inforina—
tion on firm R&D expenditures.—14—
II. Productivity Growth at the Firm Level
A. Data and Basic Facts
In this section we examine the growth of productivity at the firm level.
Because of our interest in assessing the contribution of R&D to productivity,
we have been assembling data on R&D performing firms in both France and the
U.S.17 Data problems and the desire for compaiable and large enough samples
limited the study period to l973-l978 and to five manufacturing industries
for which we had a sufficient number of firms (at least 30) in each of
the countries: Drugs, Chemicals (excluding Drugs), Electronics, Electrical
Equipment (excluding Computers), and Machinery. The exact definition of these
five industries in terms of the two or three digit French "NAP" or U.S. "SIC"
classifications is indicated in Table 4 in the Appendix. It differs somewhat from
our aggregate industry breakdown. The "parachemical" firms were brought together
with the chemical firms (rather than with the drug firms) and the medical instru-
ment firms were added to the "drug" industry. The electronics and electrical
equipment firms are treated separately, and computer and (nonmedical) instrument
firms have been excluded, since there were too few of them in France.
Our samples correspond best to the subtotal of the four aggregate industries
(2 + 7 + 8 + 14) given separately in Table 1 of the previous section. The number
of firms is relatively small (N =185)in the French sample and only somewhat
larger (N =343)in the U.S. one, but these firms do account for about 25 and 85
percent of the total number of employees in these four aggregate industries in
France and the U.S. respectively. They are not a representative sample from these—15—
industries, however. First, because we include only R&D doing firms and second,
because our data cleaning efforts result in additional selection. In particular,
firms which grew through major mergers have been excluded.13
That the use of similar selection procedures in both countries yields a much
lower coverage for the French sample than the U.S. one is rather interesting.
Only about a third of the French firms (in terms of the number of employees)
in these industries have significant levels of R&D expenditures as against
most of the firms in the U.S. This difference in the industrial structure of the
two countries also accounts for the observed discrepancy between the R&D to sales
ratios at the firm and industry levels in the two countries. (See the Data Sources
Appendix for more details.)
In addition to constructing our samples along the same lines for both coun-
tries, we also defined and measured our main variables as similarly as possible.
Output is defined as deflated sales. The industrial level of the sales deflators
depends on their respective availability in the two countries (11 different price
Indices for the French and 25 for the U.S. data).19 Labor is measured by the total
number of employees and gross physical capital stock by the book value of gross
plant adjusted for inflation (based on a rough estimate of the average age of
the capital stock). An R&D capital stock variable is constructed as a weighted
sum of past R&D expenditures, using a 15 percent rate of depreciation and all
of the pre—1973 information on R&D that we could get for our firms.2° Because
materials purchases and labor costs are not separated for most U.S. firms (they
are lumped together in the cost of goods sold item) it was not possible to treat
materials as a separate factor of production and estimate a TFP index similar
to that computed atthe industry level. We focus, therefore, on labor productivity
Q/L and on an approximate TFP measure Q/[L75 C25], which assumes the propor-
tionality of materials to value added and uses constant labor and physical capital—16—
cost shares.21 We also put more emphasis on econometric estimates of the contri-
bution of physical investment and R&D to labor productivity growth, using a
standard Cobb—Douglas production function framework to allow factor elasticities
to diverge from their corresponding cost shares.
Table 4 presents means and standard deviations of the growth rates of our
main variables between 1973 and 1978 and of their levels as of 1974. It also
reports their weighted growth rates and compares them to the corresponding
aggregate growth rates.22 The standard deviations of the rates of growth of
labor productivity are 4.9 and 3.9 percent per ear in the French and U.S. samples
respectively and the corresponding interquartile ranges are [—.1; 6.0] and
[—1.8; 3.4]. In fact, when one looks at any histogram of individual rates of
growth, or any plot of them, the scatters overlap widely across countries. This
is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 which show for both samples the histogram of
q—n (labor productivity growth rate) and the plot of q—n against c—n (capital stock
per employee growth rate).
Another interesting point is that the dispersion of growth rates, even though
quite large in its own terms, is rather small (about a tenth) relative to the dis-
persion of the corresponding levels. Moreover, growth rates and levels are almost
uncorrelated, GIBRAT's law holding also for productivity growth and not just for
the growth in size (number of employees or sales), as it is usually formulated.23
These two features are reflected in the long period stability of firm rankings by
absolute productivity in spite of the great variability in their productivity
growth rates.—17—
Looking at the average growth rates of our variables and comparing
unweighted to weighted averages, it appears that smaller firms are growing
faster than larger ones in the U.S., while no such differential tendency is
apparent in France. This is particularly striking when we look at the number of
employees, but is also true for the growth in sales and capital. Some of this
may be explained by differences in the size (and also in the range of sizes) of
French and U.S. firms: the geometric means of the number of employees being 900
in France and 3000 in the U.S.24
Given all the discrepancies that could have arisen from the selection of
our samples and the measurement of our variables, the agreement between our
"micro" and "macro" numbers is rather surprising. The weighted sample means and
the corresponding four industries aggregates are not that far—off. In France,
the growth of R&D firms has been apparently more rapid than that for the corres-
ponding industries as a whole, which is not surprising. Curiously, the reverse
seems to be the case for the U.S., R&D firms having a somewhat lower growth in
employment (although they invested more) and a lower growth of sales than the
corresponding industries. We have already noted the remarkable difference between
our "micro" and "macro" R&D to sales ratios. French R&D doing firms have been
investing relatively more in research and development than their U.S. counterparts,
but since they constitute a much smaller proportion of the totals the opposite
is true for the corresponding industries taken as a whole. The unweighted and
weighted average R&D to sales ratios are 4.8 and 3.7 percent respectively for the
French sample, 2.6 and 2.9 percent for the U.S. sample, while the corresponding
industry estimates are 2.6 and 3.0 percent respectively.25
In spite of such differences, comparing the 1973—78 productivity growth in
the two countries yields essentially the same picture as before. Both labor and
total factor productivity (based on our rough calculation with a capital share of—18—
.25) increased much faster in France than in tile U.S., by 1.5 to 2.0 percent
per year.
We should, finally, remark on the comparison of productivity levels in the
two countries given in Table 4 using 5 Francs for 1 dollar as an approximate rate
of conversion. Though productivity growth has been more rapid in France, labor
productivity levels are still below those in the U.S. by about as much as 25
percent on the average. Part of this gap may be due to differences in physical
capital intensity and the scale of enterprises between the two countries.—19—
B. Assessing the Contribution of R&D to Productivity Growth
In an attempt to assess the contribution of R&D as well as that of physical
capital to productivity growth, we find it convenient to pooi the French and U.S.
samples together. This is not unreasonable since the standard deviations of our
variables and the correlations between them are rather similar in both samples.
Among different ways of handling such panel data, we chose to analyze differences
in firm growth rates between 1973 and 1978. This has the advantage that the
general economic situation in these two years was good in both countries, in con-
trast to the 1975—1976 recession years. Compared to using year .to year growth
rates, it also has the advantage of reducing biases due to measurement errors
in the variables (diminishing the ratio of error to true variance). In doing so,
we discard all the cross—sectional information in our data panel, relying only on
its time series components. As we know from the literature on the econometrics
of panel data and from previous work, cross sectional estimates often differ from
time series estimates. In our earlier studies (see Griliches—Mairesse (1981) and
Cuneo—Mairesse (1982)), they actually provide more sensible estimates of the elas-
ticity of output with respect to R&D capital. Despite that, we do not report
here on such cross—sectional estimates to keep the analysis parallel to the first
section.
Let us denote by q—n ,c—nand k—n the annual rate of growth between
1973 and 1978 of labor productivity, physical, and R&D capital—labor ratios
respectively (dropping for simplicity the firm subscripts 1); and by COU, IND,
SIZ the appropriate set of dummy variables indicating whether or not firms belong
to one of the two countries, one of the five industries, or one of four size
groups (which we defined to controlfor the different range in the number of
employees in the French and U.S. samples). The following types of regressions
were estimated:—20—
(q-n) =(c—n) + 6 (k—n) + DUN+ e
or
(q—n) =COU (c—n) +(S COU(k—n)+ DUN+ e
or
(q—n) =•(COUIND(c—n) + 6 C0U.IND(k-n) + DUN+ e
where the slope coefficients are first constrained to be constant across
countries and industries and then free to differ across countries and also
across industries; and where DUN denotes either the set of dummy variables
COU, IND, IND COU, SIZ (13 independent ones) or only the subset COU, SIZ
(5 independent ones). When the full set of dummy variables is included, the
regressions are based only on intracountry and intraindustry growth differences.
When the industry dummies and their interactions are excluded, the regressions
are based also on interindustry growth differences and are therefore more similar
to those computed in the first section. To relate these regressions even more
closely to the previous analysis and because we did not find evidence of a
statistically signif cant contribution of k—n (the growth in R&D capital) to
productivity growth, we used also an R&D intensity variable (R/S74) instead of
the R&D capital measure. We used the R&D to sales ratio as of 1974 instead of
a comparable 1973 ratio, so as to avoid any spurious correlation with the 1973—
78 growth rate in labor productivity q—n. The substitution of R/S for k—n
implies a different specification of the production function, one that assumes
a constant marginal product for R&D rather than a constant elasticity across
firms or industries (see Griliches—Lichtenberg, 1982).—21—
Our main results are summarized in Table 5 which gives the estimated
parameters of interest for a number of specifications we tested. Starting
with the simplest analysis of variance which uses only dummy variables, we
find that all the effects are statistically significant. \mong the various
dummy variables, the country andindustry effects are most highly significant
while the size effects are less so, implying a slight tendency for faster
growth of productivity in larger firms. The country—industry interactions
are just on the border of statistical significance.
In addition to such country and industry effects, physical capital growth
also contributes significantly to the growth in labor productivity, especially
when constrained to have the same average elasticity in all five industries.
The evidence is weaker when different industries are considered separately. But
the discrepancies in the estimated elasticities by industries and countries are
not statistically significant, and we can maintain the hypothesis of a common
elasticity. Given the small size of our industry subsamples, we cannot really
discern differences in elasticities across industries.
In contrast to physical capital, growth in R&D capital is not significant
at all, even when we impose a constant elasticity across industries. These
negative results may be due to our turbulent sample period (see Griliches—
Mairesse (1981)), and also to problems of measurement. Double counting of R&D
related employees and R&D related capital expenditures in our actual measure of
labor and physical capital stock may obscure the relation between productivity
and R&D investments. In the French sample, where we can correct for some of
these problems, we obtain much more sensible looking estimates, with an estimated
output elasticity of R&D capital 6 of about .1 (see Cuneo—Mairesse (1982)).—22—
On the other hand, the R&D to sales ratio does turn out to contribute
significantly to the explanation of the interindustry differences in produc-
tivity growth. When it is restricted, however, to the explanation of intra—
industry differences, the contribution of R/S dwindles to insignificance. In
the interindustry regressions, the estimated coefficient of R/S (p), which can
be interpreted as the marginal product or gross rate of return of R&D, is .28,
while in the intraindustry regressions (those containing industry dummy variables)
it is only .12. Part of the discrepancy might be attributable to externalities,
the fact that R&D performed by a particular firm may benefit other firms in the
same industry. Unfortunately, the evidence of an intraindustry effect becomes
especially weak, when we relax the constraint that the coefficient p be the same in
the different industries. Nonetheless, to end on a positive note, it is quite
encouraging that the contribution of R&D to productivity growth is confirmed by
our analyses at both the industrial and the firm levels. It may evenbe a bit
of luck that the estimated order of magnitude of the overall gross rate of return
to investment in R&D comes out so close in both cases: about .25, somewhat more
perhaps in France and less in the U.S.—23--
III. Conclusions
Analyzing the French and U.S. industrial data we confirmed both the fact
of faster productivity growth in France and the pervasiveness of the recent
productivity slowdown. Looking at the individual industry experiences did not
yield any new clues about its sources, but it did reject some old ones. Three
explanations (shortfall In investment, rise in material prices, and a decline
in the intensity of R&D investment) were examined and were found not to bear
on the differences in productivity growth across the two countries. Indus-
tries with above (below) average growth in physical capital did not have an
above (below) average growth rate of total factor productivity. Industries
that experienced above average growth in the price of materials and/or had
been more materials intensive, did not appear to have suffered differentially.
And, while we did find some modest evidence of a positive effect of R&D on
productivity, it could account for only very little of the aggregate cross—
country differences, since the overall R&D investment intensities were not
higher in France than in the U.S.
Looking at the individual firm data did not change these conclusions.
The major impression that emerged was one of variance. At the firm level,
the estimated output elasticity of physical capital is positive and statis-
tically significant but does not exceed its factor share in either country.
Thus, there is no evidence for the notion that investxnent in fixed assets is
more important in accounting for changes in labor productivity than is already
implied in the usual total factor productivity calculations. Because amuchstnaller—24—
proportion of firms in an industry do R&D in France than in the U.S., it
turns out that the French sample is more research intensive than our U.S.
one, while the reverse is true at the aggregate level for the corres-
ponding industries. Nevertheless, the estimated R&D effects are statisti-
cally significant and of comparable magnitude at both the micro and macro
levels; they cannot account, however, for much of the observed differences
in productivity growth.
This is our first look at the comparative performance of manufacturing
industries and firms in France and the U.S. It is obvious that we have still
many unsolved problems and puzzles, both as far as data quality is concerned
and in understanding the substance of what has happened. But we have made a
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 3: Output, Productivity, and Price Growth Regressions: 15
Manufacturing Industries in U.S. and France, 1967—72, and
1973—78.





s c s in [s1(1—s




U.S. 2.21 .93 .62 1.21
(.47) (.43) (.26)
a 1.13 .44 1.23 1.20
(.58) (.58) (.22)
France 1.36 .32 1.14 1.18
(.52) (.54) (.21)
Combineda 1.11 1.08 1.37 1.08
(.26) (1.9) (.16)




U.S. .90 1.11 1.33
(.47) (.19)
France .46 1.21 1.17
(.50) (.19)








IV. Mixed Partial Produc-
tivity
u.s. .92 .64 1.34
(.23) (.25)
*
France 1.06 .44 1.46
(.28 (.14)
Combined IV .87 —.22 n.c.
(,23) (.32)B. Dual Price Regressions




q U.S. 1.36 .65 1.67 1.13
(.49) (.26) (.24)




p —s p U.S. 2.01 1.55 1.09 q c c (34) (.19)




U.S. —.60 .33 3.99
(.69) (.54)
France .22 .04 4.66
(.12) (.11)
q, .,c,m, and p's are rates of growth of output, labor, capital and materials and of the
relevant output and input price indexes.[x =log —logX_s)/5]
s —average(beginning and end period) estimated factor shares of the respective inputs.
Combined equations estimated using generalized least squares, allowing a freely correlated
disturbance matrix (4x4) between countries and time periods across industries. I.e., four
separate equations (2 periods x 2 countries) are estimated, with the relevant coefficients
constrained to be the same across equations.
All equations contain separate unconstrained country and period constant terms.
Combined IV treats [5m/(l_Sm)](PmPq) as endogeneous, using [Sm/(l_Sm)Jpm and
as additional instrumental variables.
a. Excludes the chemicals industry.
*.Thevariable here is [S/(l_sm)]C
n.c. —notcomputed



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5: Productivity grofth differences, pooled French—U.S. sample
(N =185+ 343= 528):Interindustry regressions (without industry
duxnmies)andintraindustry regressions (with industry dwnmies, and
possibly separate industry slopes).
Different Specifications Coefficients (standard errors) of Residual
France and U.S. Combined c-n k—n R/S Standard
___________________________________________________ Error
Interindustry estimates .17 .02 — 4.26
(.04) (.03)
.17 — .28 4.18
(.03) (.06)





France and U.S. Separately FR US FR US
Interindustry estimates .19 .16 .31 .19 4.18
(.06) (.04) (.07) (.11)
Drugs .20 .08 .27 .41
Intra— (.09) (.10) (.15) (.23)
industryChemicals .40 .03 .00 —.l9 3.99
estimates, (.19) (.09) (.23) (.36)
different Electronics —.04 .21 .12 —.06
(.18) (.06) (.11) (.19)
Electrical
equipment .13 .15 .45 .44
(.14) (.10) (.24) (.33)
Machinery .21 .25 —.55 .11
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1. See Denison, 1979 and Nordhaus, 1982, for a more detailed discussion
of some of these issues.
2. This conclusion depends on the exact choice of time periods. If
1972 is chosen to divide the two time periods instead of 1973, the
magnitude of the deceleration is essentially the same in both countries.
The U.S. peaked more in 1973.
3.See Appendix Table A2 for this detail.
4 While there is agreement on the general outlines of the slowdown,there remains much disagreement among various sources about its
exact magnitude, especially at the more detailed industrial level.
TFP estimates for manufacturing industries at the 2—digit SIC level
have been computed in the U.S. by Gollup and Jorgenson (1980) through
1973 and by Kendrick and Grossman (1980) and APC, (1981)), through
1979. They vary quite a bit from each other (in the 1967—73 overlap
period the correlations between these estimates and between them and
ours is only on the order of 0.5). Some of the discrepancies could be
explained by the use of different data bases (revised vs. unrevised,
Census vs. NIPA) and some by differences in methodology (value added
vs. gross output, Divisia vs. fixed weight indexes), but the size of
some of them remains a puzzle. Within the confines of this paper we
cannot pursue this further, but we hope to return to it in the sequel.
5. This difference is smaller if we look at employment rather than
manhours.
.Thesefacts have been noticed before. See, for example, Sachs (1979).
7 .Theymay be thinking primarily of the behavior of output per manhour,
a measure that does not take into account the contribution of the other
inputs. Some of the fluctuations in output per manhour are due to differ-
ential movements in capital and/or materials. The concept of total factor
productivity attempts to allow for this by including all the major inputs
in its definition of total input, weighting them in proportion to their
share in total factor costs.8. To reduce dependence, these regressions are based on a partition
of the data into two non—overlapping periods: 1967—72 and 1973-78. The
results are similar when other partitionings, 1967—73 or 1972—78 are
used instead.
9•It makes little sense to think of input changes an exogeneous in
this context of rather aggregate changes over five year periods. The
regressions should be interpreted as a data summary device and not as
structural estimates of the production function.The partial produc-
tivity regressions try to focus on the contribution of specific inputs
by constraining the other coefficients to reasonable a priori values.
10. These results are robust to the exclusion of the chemicals industry
with its possibly bad U.S. numbers from these regressions and to the
use of slightly different time periods.
11. One should note that our definition of purchased materials includes
also materials purchased from the same and other manufacturing industries
and is not a net "outside" materials concept. The computed materials
price changes understate, therefore, the true magnitude of changes in the
price of "outside" materials. But the computed share of all "materials"
overstates their overall importance, with the product of the two being
essentially unaffected by this distinction. Let the computed p (rate of
growth in materials prices) be =(l—d)p+ dp, where
Pq
and are
the rates of growth of the industries own price level and of outside
materials prices respectively andd the share of purchases of
"outside" materials in total expenditures on materials. Then the vari-




is the same as if we had
used the "outside" definition of materials. Our conclusions should,therefore, be robust with respect to the exact definition of "materials"
and the boundaries of the various industries. (We are grateful to
Michael Bruno for this remark.)
12. See Bruno (1981), equation 8.
13. Moreover, our data are not very powerful in this respect. The
real price of materials varies surprising little over 5 year periods.
It appears that most of the materials price changes were passed through
to output prices within this length of time.
14. Most of the evidence presented in Bruno (1981) for the materials
story is based on aggregate annual time series for different countries.
France is not considered explicitly and the results for the U.S. are
not as good as for some of the other countries.
15. The OLS estimates, although less precise, are very similar to the
SUR estimates. When we use total R&D to sales ratio (or R&D employment
to total employment ratio) instead of company R&D to sales ratio, we
obtain rather poor and statistically insignificant estimates for the
U.S. These are due mainly to one outlier, the U.S. Aircraft, boats
and space vehicles industry, which had very low TFP growth rates (the
lowest in the first period) and the highest total R&D to sales ratio
(of which 80 percent is federally funded). When this industry is
left out of the sample all estimates become comparable. Earlier work
has also shown that productivity growth in the U.S. is more closely
related to company R&D expenditures than to the federally financed
components of total R&D.
16. The total R&D to sales ratio in U.S. manufacturing declines from
about 4,4 percent in the mid 60's to 3.1 in the mid 70's. The decline
is much smaller, however, for company financed R&D, from a peak of 2.2
percent in 1969 to a low of 2.0 in the mid 1970's.17.See Griliches and Mairesse (1981) and Cuneo and Mairesse (1982) for a descrip-
tion of earlier work and for more detail on these data.
18.We recognized "major mergers" by large jumps in the data such as the
doubling of gross plant, sales or the number of employees. This eliminated
about 50 firms from the French sample and 80 from the U.S. one.
19. For the U.S. sample firm specific price indices where also computed as
weighted averages of sectoral indices, the weights being obtained, from the
information on sales by different business segments within a company in 1978.
Using such firm specific price indices did not alter our results in any significant
way.
20.We were able to use R&D data as far back as 1963 for two—thirds of the
French sample, and at least back to 1968 for practically all the firms of the
French sample and most of the firms in the U.S. sample.We tried also
alternative measures of R&D capital, retrapolating R&D series on the basis of the
corresponding industry growth rates instead of using all the firm information
whenever possible and adopting a 30 percent rate of depreciation. The means of
such different measures differ of course appreciably (and thus the estimates
exhibited in Table 4 for our main measure are only roughly indicative) but the
estimated regression coefficients (elasticities) are practically unchanged.
21. Using specific country and industry cost shares of labor and physical capi-
tal (rather than .75 and .25) to compute an alternative TFP variable did not
affect our results significantly.22.Table 4 in the Appendix gives similar detail for the five industry
subsaniples.
23.For example, the correlation between the 1973—78 growth in labor produc-
tivity and its level in 1974 is only —0.05 and —0.07 in the French and U.S.
samples respectively, while the correlation between the growth rate in employ-
ment and its level is only —0.02 and —0.15. For references to GIBRAT's law
and related literature, see Marris (1979).
24. The arithmetic means of the number of employees are 2100 and 12600 in the
French and U.S. samples respectively. While the growth in employment was about
the same in France for firms with less than 2000 employees and for those with
more than 2000 employees, in the U.S the respective growth rates were 3.6 and
1.7 percent.
25.The large difference between the unweighted and weighted ratios in France
implies a difference in the R&D intensity of small and large firms: 5.1 percent
in firms with less than 2000 employees, 3.8 percent for those with more than
2000 employees.References
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vol. LXIII, No. 3, pp. 454—458.Appendix ——DataSources at the Industry and the Firm Level
The French industrial data come from the Natidnal Accounts data
bases. Gross output, materials (intermediate consumption) and their
associated price indexes and the total number of employees by indus-
try are taken from'Le comptsde l'Industridt— Les Collections de
l'INSEE no.: C55 (1977), C76 (1979), C92 (1981). Hours of work are
obtained by multiplying the average total number of employees, over
the year, by the average number of hours worked per week by produc-
tion workers in the same years. The latter is taken from the INSEE
national accounts data bank. For a description of the methods used
in constructing capital stock see J. Nairesse, "L'evaluation du
capital fixe productif. Methocset Resultats" —LesCollection de
1'INSEE no.: C18—l9 (1972). The numbers are taken from INSEE national
accounts data bank. The share of labor in gross output is compütdd
from the labor share in value added data, available in "Les comptes d'—
entreprises par secteurs" (see Les Collection de l'INSEE, C78 (1979))
by multiplying them by where S IS the share of materials
in gross output. The estimates from the "sectoral" national accounts
(based on firm's data) are not quite coherent with the other estimates
from the "branch" national accounts (more or less based on establish-
ments data). But at our level of industrial aggregation and for our
purpose of computing TFP estimates, the possible discrepancies are
negligible.
The U.S. industrial data are aggregated from the 4—digit SIC leveldatabase constructed by the Penn—SRI—Census project (Fromm et al, 1979)
and updated and extended at the NBER by Wayne Grey and Frank Lich—
tenberg. The basic data come from the Census Annual Surveys of
Manufactures while the price series are based on the underlying
detailed national income defiators. Labor input (total hours) is
computed by dividing total payrolls in operating establishments by
the average hourly wage rate of production workers. It can be inter-
preted as an estimate of total man—hours in production worker equiva1eit.
units. The capital stock data were constructed by Fawcett and
Associates for Penn—SRI by perpetual inventory methods from Census
sources. Output and input price indexes are based on unpublished
detailed National Income deflators and tabulations. The price index
of Intermediate consumption was revised at the NBER by using the
1972 1—0 Table and 1—0 sector level price indexes constructed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The total labor costs were revised at
the NBER by adding the payrolls of Central and Auxiliary Offices for
Census years and interpolating in the intercensal years.
One source of discrepancies between the French and U.S. industrial
data sets is that the latter are based on Census sources and not on NIPA
conventions. In particular, in the U.S. Census, the notion of "materials"
does not include all intermediate consumption, excluding especially
purchased services. Since the capital share (Sc) is computed residually,
it is somewhat too high in the U.S., perhaps by as much as a third (see
the attempt at reconciliation of value added and GNP originating in the
U.S. Census of Manufactures, 1977, Vol. 1, p. XXVII).The French firm sample is the result of matching two different
data sources: INSEE provided us with the balance—sheet and current
account numbers (from the SUSE files) while the Ministry of Industry
and Research provided the R&D numbers (from the annual survey on
company R&D expenditures). The U.S. firm sample is built from the
information available in the Standard and Poor's Compustat Industrial
Tape. These samples are larger than the ones actually used in Criliches—
Mairesse (1981) and Cuneo—Mairesse (1982). More details on the construc-
tion and cleaning of the samples, as well as on the definition and

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 APPENDIX TABLE 3




















































French R—D numbers are estimated from "Le Compte Satellite de le Recherche,
Methodeset series 1970—1976 "LesCollections de 1"INSEE C85
(1979);
U.S. ones are estinEted from NSF79. 313 —Researchand Development in
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Numbers of employees (E), in thousands, and R&D Bales ratios (R/S),
in percct, for the French and U.S. samples for the corresponding
aggregat industries, and also for all "R&D doing firms" in the two
countries *
Samples(S)R&DDoingFirrns(R)CorresndingIidUStrieQ Coverage
Es (R/S)s ER (K/b)R (K/b)1Kr/S)1 E5/E1 ER/ES
%
France (174) 395 3.7 565 4.3 1550 2.6 3.3 25 35
u.S. (1976) 4250 2.9 4500 2.6 4900 2.9 4.1 85 90
*
Theestimates for the samples and the corresponding industries arethe ones obtained in
this study. The estimates for the R&D doingfirms" are computed from "Le Recherche—
Development dans les entreprises industrielles en 1974"(Documentation francaise 1977)
and from "Who does R&D and who patents?" (Bound et al, 1982). Numbers of employees
are in thousands, R&D sales ratios in percent. RT/S refers to ratio of total R&D performed
in the industry (whether company or public financed), while R/S refers only to company
financed R&D. These estimates are only indicative, and can be misleading for a number of
reasons .First,they are not strictly comparable, since computers and nonmedical instru-
ments are not included in our samples, while they are part of the corresponding industries.
This explains specifically why CR/S)1 appears to be higher than (R/S)s and (R/S)R in the
U.S. Second, they are not strictly comparable also due to the conglomerateness and the
importance of foreign activities of many of our firms, particularly in the U.S., while
the industry level numbers are establishment based and cover only domestic activities.
This results in a severe overestimation of the coverage ratios in the U.S., but is not
enough to change the finding that the proportion of R&D doing firms in the industries
considered is much less in France than in the U.S. Third, the cutoff point between R&D
and non#R&D doing firms seems somewhat higher in France than in the U.S. This is not
enough, however, to account for the finding that R&D doing firms appear to do relatively
more R&D in proportion to their sales in France than in the U.S. Fourth, the picture
differs across industries, the coverage and the R&D sales ratios being both much less
for machinery than for drugs and chemicals or for electronics andelectricalequipment.